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Interpretations of the Clean Water Act
are as Muddy and Polluted as the Water
the Act Seeks to Protect
Lauren Keeler*
INTRODUCTION
The Clean Water Act (CWA) was passed in 1972 with the
worthy purpose of eliminating the discharge of pollutants into the
navigable waters of the United States.' To achieve this objective,
the CWA expressly forbids pollution in navigable waters without a
permit.2 The permits referred to in the CWA are issued under the
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES).3 This
discharge of a pollutant is further defined as the addition of any
pollutant to navigable waters, explicitly from a "point source."4
While the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) enforces this
Act,5 the states are responsible for carrying out the purposes of the
CWA because the Act recognizes each state's ultimate authority
over the waters within its jurisdiction.6
Congress has drawn a line between federal and state
regulation in its delineation between point-source pollution and
nonpoint-source pollution,7 as well as its distinctions between
navigable and non-navigable waters.8 Confusingly, this means
that the CWA's authority can end either after it determines that
the source of pollution is nonpoint-source, or after the pollution is
of non-navigable waters.9 The vague definitions of "point-source
pollution" and "navigable waters" have left jurisdictions without a
* Staff Editor of the KY. J. EQUINE AGRIC. & NAT. RESOURCES L.; BA. 2017 Florida
State University; J.D. expected May 2020, University of Kentucky College of Law.
1 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2018).
2 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2018); see also 33 U.S.C.S. 1342(a)(1) (2018).
3 See U.S.C. § 1342 (2018).
4 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (2018).
5 33 U.S.C. § 1251(d) (2018).
6 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (2018).
7 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12), (14) (2018); see also Ky. Waterways All. v. Ky. Utils. Co.,
905 F.3d 925, 929 (6th Cir. 2018) (stating that "Point-source pollution is subject to the
NPDES requirements, and thus, to federal regulation under the CWA. But all other forms
of pollution are considered nonpoint-source pollution and are within the regulatory ambit
of the states.").
8 See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (highlighting a distinction between "navigable water",
'waters of contiguous zone" and "the ocean").
9 Id.
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clear answer as to where Congress intended the line to be drawn.10
The EPA acknowledged the abundance of conflicting case law in
this area and emphasized the effects that clarification of this issue
could have on those trying to follow the CWA's guidelines."
Furthermore, the CWA does not address whether its authority
extends to cover groundwater-a common conduit for pollution
across the United States-sparking considerable litigation in
response to the Act's lack of clarity on the issue.12
Private citizens are empowered under the Act to file civil
actions against those who violate the CWA.13 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rendered decisions on
September 24, 2018, in two separate cases involving allegations of
CWA violations.14 In both Kentucky Waterways Alliance v.
Kentucky Utilities Company and Tennessee Clean Water Network
v. Tennessee Valley Authority, the Sixth Circuit rejected prior
decisions from the Ninth and Fourth Circuits (in Upstate Forever
v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners LP and Hawai'i Wildlife Fund
v. County ofMaui) creating a circuit split.15 These cases have left
the question of whether groundwater is a point source under the
Act unresolved, therefore requiring a company or individual to
obtain an NPDES permit to legally discharge pollutants into
10 See Rachel Jacobson, H. David Gold & Sarah C. Judkins, Sixth Circuit Holds
Clean Water Act Does Not Require Permits for Discharges to Groundwater, WILMERHALE
(Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.wilmerhale.comlen/insights/cient-alerts/20181001-sixth-cir-
cuit-holds-clean-water-act-does-not-require-permits-for-discharges-to-groundwater
[https://perma.ce/R5KR-53Z9; see also Henry R. Pollard V, Debate Over Groundwater
Pathway for Clean Water Act Jurisdiction Continues, But States Could Step In, WILLIAMS
MULLEN (Dec. 27, 2018), https://www.williamsmullen.comlnews/debate-over-groundwater-
pathway-clean-water-act-jurisdiction-continues-states-could-step [https://perma.cc/7QAA-
55Z3].
" Clean Water Act Coverage of "Discharges of Pollutants" via a Direct Hydrologic
Connection to Surface Water, 83 Fed. Reg. 34,7126 (Feb. 20, 2018) [hereinafter Clean Water
Act Coverage] (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 122), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-
2018-02-20/pdf/2018-03407.pdf [http://perma.ccUZ3N-6T9Q]; see also R. Timothy Weston,
Cliff L. Rothenstein, Marie E. Quasius, What's The Point (Source)? New Developments in
the Ongoing Debate Concerning Clean Water Act Jurisdiction over Indirect Discharges via
Groundwater, K&L GATES (Mar. 4, 2018), http://www.klgates.com/whats-the-point-source-
03-04-2018/ [https://perma.ccX5YR-27SB].
12 Clean Water Act Coverage, supra note 11, at 7127-28.
1 33 U.S.C.S. § 1365(a)-(b) (2018).
'4 See Ky. Waterways All., 905 F.3d at 928; see also Tenn. Clean Water Network
v. TVA, 905 F.3d 436, 438 (6th Cir. 2018).
' See Ky. Waterways All., 905 F.3d at 941; see also Tenn. Clean Water Network,
905 F.3d at 448.
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groundwater that eventually reaches navigable waters.16 More
specifically, there is a question as to when the CWA authorizes the
imposition of liability when a pollutant is discharged from a point
source to groundwater, and then through groundwater to surface
water.17
The Sixth Circuit held firm in its interpretation of the
CWA, determining that groundwater is a nonpoint-source, and
therefore, that the CWA has no authority to prescribe liability for
pollution that flows from it. 1 8 Alternatively, the Fourth and Ninth
Circuit courts have interpreted that the discharge of a pollutant
that passes through groundwater is under the jurisdiction of the
CWA as an enforceable violation.19 The major point of convergence
in these cases is found in each circuit court's interpretation of the
"hydrological connection theory."20 While the Fourth and Ninth
Circuits upheld the theory, the Sixth Circuit expressly rejected it. 2 1
Consequently, localized jurisdictions continue to proffer varying
interpretations.2 2 This Note argues that the United States
Supreme Court should accept the hydrological connection theory
in line with the Fourth and Ninth Circuits. The Supreme Court
should do so because (1) the purposes of the CWA will have a
greater likelihood of coming to fruition,23 (2) pollution from a point
source that is "fairly traceable" from said point source when it ends
up in navigable waters of the United States is essentially the same
type of pollution the CWA aims to federally regulate,24 and (3) to
16 See Jacobson, Gold & Judkins supra note 10.
17 Joel C. Beauvais & Stacey L. VanBelleghem, Courts Block Coal Ash Suits, Set-
ting up US Supreme Court Showdown, LATHAM & WATKINS LLP (Sep. 27, 2018),
https://www.globalelr.com/2018/09/courts-block-coal-ash-suits-setting-up-us-supreme-
court-showdown/ [https://perma.cc/RP7T-9VB8].
Is Ky. Waterways All., 905 F.3d at 934.
'9 Upstate Forever v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P., 887 F.3d 637, 651
(4th Cir. 2018); Hawai'i Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui, 886 F.3d 737, 747-49 (9th Cir.
2018).
n Saul Ewing Arnstein & Lehr LLP, Supreme Court to Decide Soon on Whether
to Wade Further Into the "Waters of the United States" Fray, JDSuPRA (Nov. 2, 2018),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/supreme-court-to-decide-soon-on-whether-76879/.
[https://perma.cc/F34S-3WFT].
21 Id.
2 See Jacobson, Gold & Judkins, supra note 10.
- See Allison L. Kvien, Is Groundwater that is Hydrologically Connected to Nav-
igable Waters Covered Under the CWA?: Three Theories of Coverage & Alternative Reme-
dies for Groundwater Pollution, 16.2 MiNN. J. OF L, Sci. & TECH. 957, 1000 (2015).
24 See Hawaii Wildlife Fund, 886 F.3d at 744.
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hold otherwise would allow polluters to escape liability on a pure
technicality.
This Note explores the different interpretations of the
discharge permit requirement that has led to the current circuit
split, discusses the United States Supreme Court's grant of
certiorari for petitions filed in the Ninth and Fourth Circuit cases,
and argues in favor of adoption of the Fourth and Ninth Circuits'
rulings. Part I of this Note discusses the purposes and goals of the
CWA, as well as the previous applications of CWA liability for
groundwater pollution. Part I also covers the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and how it coincides with
the enforcement of the CWA. Furthermore, Part I addresses the
"Waters of the United States" rule established by the EPA and the
United States Army Corps of Engineers, which aimed to define
exactly what "waters" the CWA protects, and how this definition
interacts with CWA interpretation. Part II analyzes the split
among the Sixth, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits and considers
arguments for and against each Circuit's proposition. Part II
further examines the current landscape of this issue and how
leaving this question to each jurisdiction without clarity will
impact the CWA's enforcement going forward. Finally, Part III
discusses the challenge the Supreme Court faces in deciding this
issue and argues for the adoption of the Fourth and Ninth Circuit's
interpretations.
I. THE CLEAN WATER ACT IS A COMPLICATED ACT OF CONGRESS,
AND ITS INTERPRETATION OFTEN DIFFERS BY ADMINISTRATION
A. Text and History of the CWA
Codified in 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq.,25 the CWA operates
with the goal of regulating not only pollution into the waters of the
United States, but also regulates water quality standards for
surface waters.26 The pollutants the CWA aims to regulate, though
defined broadly, include "industrial, municipal, and agricultural
2533 U.S.C. § 1251, et seq. (2018).
sUMMARY OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/summary-clean-water-act [https://perma.cc/LRJ7-
XQFN].
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waste" discharged in water.27 In its text, the CWA provides that
"the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful,"
unless said person has a permit authorized under the NPDES.2 8
The terms "discharge" and "point source," though defined by the
Act,29 have continued to create conflicts in interpretation.30 A
"discharge" is "any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters
from any point source."31 Furthermore, a "point source" is "any
discernible, confined and discrete conveyance . . . from which
pollutants are or may be discharged."32 This means that any form
of pollution that is considered non-point source pollution falls
outside the control of the CWA and within the discretion of
individual states.33 Examples of what qualifies as a point source
under the CWA definition includes "discernible, confined and
discrete conveyance[s], such as a pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel,
conduit, discrete fissure, or container," but this is still a heavily
litigated area of environmental aw. 3 4
While there are varying interpretations of the meaning of
words like "discharge," and "point source,"35 courts have
consistently interpreted the CWA to require five elements be met
for a CWA violation claim to go forward.36 Those five elements are:
"(1) discharg[ing] (2) a pollutant (3) into navigable waters (4) from
a point source (5) without a [NPDES] permit."3 7 NPDES permits
are the mechanism through which the CWA is monitored and
27 See NATIONAL POLLUTANT DISCHARGE ELIMINATION SYSTEM PERMIT BASICS,
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY [hereinafter NPDES PERMIT BASICS],
https://www.epa.gov/npdes/npdes-permit-basics [https://perma.cc/BU67-Y7NNI.
- 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2018); see also Joseph DeQuarto, Latest Interpretation of
the Clean Water Act Creates Circuit Split, THE REGULATORY R. (Dec. 20, 2018),
https://www.theregreview.org/2018/12/20/dequarto-latest-interpretation-clean-water-act-
circuit-split/ [https://perma.cc/8DR4-FZJ8].
- 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (2018).
3 See Jacobson, Gold & Judkins, supra note 10.
31 33 U.S.C. § 1362.
3 Id.
3 Ky. Waterways All., 905 F.3d at 929.
- 33 U.S.C. § 1362; See e.g., United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474
US 121, 135, 139 (1985); Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531
U.S. 159, 167-68 (2001); Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 732-33 (2006).
a See e.g., Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 135, 139; Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S.
at 167-68; Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 732-33.
36 See Sierra Club v. El Paso Gold Mines, Inc., 421 F.3d 1133, 1142 (10th Cir.
2005).
" Id.
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enforced.3 8 These permits ensure that the discharge of pollutants
will be limited, monitored, and reported based on the limitations
and requirements each permit prescribes, and each one is
specifically tailored to each operation and person involved in
discharging pollutants.39 In theory, this system should be
straightforward to implement because only those who discharge
from a point source into the waters of the United States are
required to have an NPDES permit.4o The process becomes
complicated when differing interpretations of what qualifies as a
"discharge" or a "point source" under the Act creates inconsistency
in the system's administration.41
Further complicating litigation in this area is the
understanding of the term "waters of the United States."42
According to EPA guidelines, this term is broadly defined as
"navigable waters, tributaries, oceans out to 200 miles from shore,
and intrastate waters which are used by interstate travelers for
recreation or other purposes, as a source of fish or shellfish sold in
interstate commerce, or for industrial purposes by industries
engaged in interstate commerce."43 With this broad definition in
mind, we can turn to the different ways that the United States
Supreme Court has previously interpreted this term and how
cumulative interpretations may have led to the current split.
B. Previous Interpretations of Key CWA Terms
In United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, the United
States Supreme Court held that a wetland "adjacent" to a lake
qualified as a "navigable water" under the CWA, and gave the
Army Corps of Engineers the authority to issue permits for the
discharge of pollutants into such waters.44 In the case, the Corps
filed suit against Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. for placing fill
materials on a construction property without a permit that was
See NPDES PERMIT BASICS, supra note 27.
Id.
40 Id.
4 See e.g., Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 135, 139; Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S.
at 167-68 Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 732-33.
42 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2018).
43NPDES PERMIT BASICS, supra note 27.
44Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 135, 139.
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believed to be a covered wetland.45 As a result, the court needed to
decide whether the Army Corps of Engineers was correct in its
interpretation of the CWA when it construed the Act to cover all
freshwater wetlands that were adjacent to other covered waters.46
Riverside Bayview turned on whether the operative phrase
"waters of the United States" as used in the Act includes wetlands,
which naturally fall into an ill-defined category of areas that are
not necessarily "waters" or "lands."47 The Court found that
Congress' goal-to "restore and maintain the chemical, physical,
and biological integrity of the Nation's waters," as stated by the
CWA48-supports the reading that wetlands adjacent to navigable
waters should be included because of their impact on water
quality.49 This is based on the argument that in order to truly
regulate activities that cause water pollution, the focus should be
on the "aquatic system" as a whole.50
In Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United
States Army Corps of Engineers, however, the Court limited the
scope of the CWA by holding that it does not have jurisdiction over
ponds.51 The Court distinguished this case from ' Riverside
Bayview, stating that Riverside Bayview was decided based on the
significant nexus between the wetlands at issue and the "navigable
waters" they were adjacent to, whereas the pond at issue in this
case was not adjacent to any navigable water, and therefore
outside the ambit of the CWA. 52 The Court further held that to
include isolated ponds, or similar waters, would render the term
"navigable waters" essentially meaningless, and to read that term
out of the statute would go too far.5 3
Finally, Rapanos v. United States further limited "waters
of the United States" under the CWA to include only "relatively
permanent, standing, or flowing bodies of water" such as
"'streams,' 'oceans,' 'rivers,' and 'bodies' of water" which form
15 Id. at 124.
46 Id. at 123-24.
47 Id. at 126.
48 33 U.S.C. §1251.
4 Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 132-34.
50 Id. at 133-34.
51 Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 167-68.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 171-72.
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geographical features.54 Under Rapanos, the federal government's
ability to regulate waters of the United States must be based on
something more than a "mere hydrological connection to a
traditional navigable waterway."5 5 Rapanos addressed whether
Michigan wetlands lying near ditches and man-made drains that
eventually reached "traditional navigable waters" qualified as
"waters of the United States" under the CWA.5 6 Rapanos answered
that question in the negative, holding that only wetlands with a
"continuous surface connection to bodies that are 'waters of the
United States' are adjacent, and therefore, covered by the Act.
5 7
Perhaps the most important takeaway from Rapanos is the
Supreme Court's holding that the CWA forbids the "addition of any
pollutant to navigable waters," but not the "addition of any
pollutant directly to navigable waters from any point source."
5 8
Therefore, some scholars argue that the court in Rapanos was less
concerned with how pollutants end up in navigable waters, but
rather that they end up there at all.5 9 This is ultimately one of the
arguments that the Fourth and Ninth Circuits adopted,
6 0 and that
the Sixth Circuit rejected.6 ' Furthermore, as this circuit split
makes evident, courts have had a difficult time applying Rapanos,
choosing instead to resolve disputes on an ad hoc basis.
62
54 Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 732-33.
55 M. Reed Hopper, Running Down the Controlling Opinion in Rapanos v. United
States, PACIFIC LEGAL FOUND. (June 12, 2017), https://pacificlegal.org/running-controlling-
opinion-rapanos-v-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/Q6JA-QY3Q]; see also, Rapanos, 547
U.S. 715 (finding that a mere hydrological connection is not enough in all cases);
5 Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 729.
67 Id. at 742.
68 Id. at 743; see also DeQuarto, supra note 28.
59 DeQuarto, supra note 28.
60 See, e.g., Upstate Forever, 887 F.3d at 648; Hawai'i Wildlife Fund, 881 F.3d at
760-61.
61 See, e.g., Ky. Waterways All, 905 F.3d at 932-33; Tenn. Clean Water Network,
905 F.3d at 443-44.
- Brad Plumer & Umair Irfan, Why Trump Wants to Repeal an Obama -Era Clean
Water Rule, Vox (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environ-
ment/2017/2/28/14761236/wotus-waters-united-states-rule-trump [https://perma.cc7G32-
JT9J].
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C. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
While the CWA is concerned specifically with water
pollution,63 the RCRA is concerned with the management of solid
waste.64 RCRA focuses on providing solid waste management
criteria to states, with the federal government providing "technical
and financial assistance to state and local governments."65 Both
the RCRA and the CWA have the similar goal of protecting public
health and the environment.66 However, the RCRA affects the
CWA because it requires the EPA to enforce guidelines for solid
waste disposal facilities to protect groundwater and surface waters
from pollutants in solid waste.67 The RCRA's interaction with the
CWA is problematic because although these statutes may be read
to be complementary, they are also mutually exclusive when the
conduct at issue requires an NPDES permit and is found to be
under the CWA's coverage, as the RCRA does not apply.6 8
This interpretation played a crucial role in the Sixth Circuit
cases of Kentucky Waterways Alliance v. Kentucky Utilities
Company and Tennessee Clean Water Network v. Tennessee
ValleyAuthority, where the majority held that a RCRA claim could
be brought by the plaintiffs, but a CWA claim could not.69 The court
held that extending CWA liability to groundwater pollution in a
RCRA context would not be the "best" interpretation of either
statute.70 In contrast, the dissent in Kentucky Waterways
advocated for a "side-by-side" application of the CWA and RCRA,
urging that enforcing CWA liability in this instance would not
preclude RCRA liability, and that imposing both would be within
the authority of the EPA.71 The dissent's viewpoint from that case
is the same that the majority in Upstate Forever v. Kinder Morgan
6 SUMMARY OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT, supra note 26.
6 42 U.S.C. § 6907 (2018).
6 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a) (2018); see also Ky. Waterways All., 905 F.3d at 929.
66 42 U.S.C. § 6907(a)(1); see 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2018).
67 42 U.S.C.S. § 6907(a)(2).
42 U.S.C. § 6903(27); Ky. Waterways All., 905 F.3d at 937-38.
6 Ky. Waterways All., 905 F.3d at 939-40; see Tenn. Clean Water Network, 905
F.3d at 445-47; see also Kevin Koeninger, Sixth Circuit Clears Utilities in Ash Pond Leak
Cases, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE (Sep. 24, 2018), https://www.courthouse-
news.com/sixth-circuit-holds-power-plants-not-liable-in-ash-pond-case/
[https://perma.cc/W88U-L5NJ].
70 Ky. Waterways All., 905 F.3d at 938.
7i Ky. Waterways All., 905 F.3d at 945; Koeninger, supra note 69.
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Energy Partners LP and Hawai'i Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui
asserted, and this difference in interpretation of these two acts'
coexistence is one of the key issues causing the circuit split we have
today.72
D. "WOTUS" Rule
In 2015, pursuant to a court order, the Clean Water Rule
came into effect and attempted to define "waters of the United
States," ("WOTUS") as it is used in the CWA. 7 3 While the Act
makes it clear that there are regulations and NPDES
requirements should people or entities discharge pollution into
these waters, Congress neglected to strictly define what WOTUS
means, instead leaving it to the EPA and the Army Corps of
Engineers to determine.74 The rule is enforced in twenty-two
states, the District of Columbia, and United States territories.75 It
is based on 1,200 scientific papers on aquatic ecosystems and types
of bodies of water, and tries to limit the specific types of bodies of
water that would need to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis
while outlining which water sources would be automatically
covered under the CWA. 76 One of the many tenets promulgated by
the rule states that under the CWA, WOTUS is not interpreted to
include groundwater.77 However, the rule confirms a case-specific
"nexus" rule established by cases like Riverside Bayview, Solid
Waste Agency, and Rapanos that would allow groundwater to be
included.78
Despite its attempt to elucidate language that the CWA left
unclear, this rule has been on hold since February 28, 2017, when
President Donald Trump signed an executive order for the rule to
be reviewed and either rescinded or revised by the EPA and the
72 See Upstate Forever, 887 F.3d at 652-53; Hawai'i Wildlife Fund, 886 F.3d at
752.
7 80 Fed. Reg. 37054 (2015).
74 Plumer & Irfan, supra note 62.
7r DEFINITION OF "WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES" UNDER THE CLEAN WATER
ACT, SECTION 404 OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY [hereinafter DEF-
INITION OF WOTUS] (Sep. 18, 2018), https://www.epa.gov/cwa-404/definition-waters-united-
states-under-clean-water-act [https://perma.cc/C4B2-GFCBL.
76 Plumer & Irfan, supra note 62.
77 Id.
78 80 Fed. Reg. 37054-01 (2015).
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Department of the Army.7 9 On December 11, 2018, the EPA and
Army released a signed proposal which would revise the definition
of WOTUS.8 0 While it has not taken effect yet, the "EPA and Army
Corps had estimated ... that 18 percent of streams and 51 percent
of wetlands would not receive federal protections under the
revisions."8 1 Furthermore, President Trump explicitly asked the
EPA to review the holding in Rapanos-specifically in regard to
the extended protection given to wetlands with "continuous surface
connection" to navigable waterways and "relatively permanent"
streams.8 2 Regardless, while the new Clean Water rule-as
ordered by President Trump-is pending, there is little clarity in
the interpretation of the term "waters of the United States."
Adding to this, the wait is nowhere near complete because of the
EPA's comment period on the rule requested by President Trump
and his projected defense of the final rule in court. All of this has
contributed to the disparity between the Sixth, Fourth, and Ninth
Circuits that we are faced with today.
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT AS IT STANDS TODAY
On September 24, 2018, the Sixth Circuit issued a ruling in
a pair of opinions: Kentucky Waterways Alliance v. Kentucky
Utilities Company and Tennessee Clean Water Network v.
Tennessee Valley Authority, which involved power plants in
Kentucky and Tennessee.8 3 The Sixth Circuit held that the utility
companies in these two cases did not violate the CWA when
contaminants made their way from coal ash ponds at the facilities
into local groundwater based on the court's interpretation of the
phrase "to navigable waters" as it is stated in the CWA, and that
coal ash ponds do not qualify as a "point source."84 However, the
Fourth Circuit in Upstate Forever v. Kinder Morgan Energy
7 DEFINITION OF WOTUS, supra note 75.
8 STEP TWO - REVISE, WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES (WOTUS) RULEMAKING,
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Dec. 28, 2018), https://www.epa.gov/wotus-rule/step-two-revise.
[https://perma.cc/FZM9-6NFG].
8I Plumer & Irfan, supra note 62.
8 Id.; see also Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 717.
8 Koeninger, supra note 69; see Ky. Waterways All., 905 F.3d at 930; see also
Tenn. Clean Water Network, 905 F.3d at 438.
8 DeQuarto, supra note 28; see also, Ky. Waterways All., 905 F.3d at 931-34;
Tenn. Clean Water, 905 F.3d at 442-44.
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Partners, and the Ninth Circuit in Hawai'i Wildlife Fund v. County
of Maui, previously announced rules that did not align with the
Sixth Circuit's.85 These Fourth and Ninth Circuit rulings reached
an interpretation contrary to the one the Sixth Circuit came to, due
in significant part to different interpretations of the broadly
defined terms "waters of the United States" and "point source" as
they are written in the CWA. 86
A. The Sixth Circuit's Interpretations
i. Kentucky Waterways Alliance v. Kentucky Utilities
Company
Kentucky Waterways Alliance was decided most recently,
creating the circuit split. In Kentucky Waterways Alliance, two
environmental conservation groups alleged that Kentucky
Utilities Company (KU), which burns coal in order to produce
energy, contaminated the groundwater surrounding man-made
ponds where the company stored leftover coal ash.8 7 As with most
coal-burning power plants, KU is situated near bodies of water
because water is necessary not only to generate power, but also to
cool and condense steam, and to treat the coal waste created in the
coal-burning process." The Sierra Club and Kentucky Waterways
Alliance contend that when KU disposed of coal ash generated by
burning coal, it released pollutants into nearby Herrington Lake
through the groundwater.89 Coal ash is made up of different
chemicals that can pollute water including "arsenic, lead, calcium,
and boron."90 Sierra Club and Kentucky Waterways Alliance also
discovered that selenium, which is healthy in small amounts, was
accumulating in excess in Herrington Lake and could potentially
harm aquatic wildlife.91 The environmental groups eventually filed
both CWA and RCRA claims against KU. 9 2
8 Upstate Forever, 887 F.3d at 652-53; Hawai'i Wildlife Fund, 881 F.3d at 745-
47.
8 See Upstate Forever, 887 F.3d at 643, 647-49, 652-53; Hawai'i Wildlife Fund,
881 F.3d at 745-47.
8 Id. at 931.
8 Id. at 930.
8 Id. at 930-31.
9 Id. at 931.
9 Ky. Waterways All., 905 F. 3d at 931.
92 Id. at 932.
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The plaintiffs provided two theories to support their
argument that a CWA claim was appropriate in this situation.93
Under the first theory, the plaintiffs argued "that groundwater is
a point source that deposits pollutants into Herrington Lake."94
The plaintiffs' argued next that even if it is not a point source
under the terms of the CWA, the hydrological connection theory
should still apply, under which "groundwater is not considered a
point source, but rather a medium through which pollutants pass
before being discharged into navigable waters."95 In explicit
disagreement with Upstate Forever and Hawai'i Wildlife Fund,
the Sixth Circuit rejected both theories by holding that the CWA
does not extend to the form of pollution that occurred here.96
Rejecting the first argument, the Court pointed to the language of
the CWA, requiring that pollution come from a "point source" that
is a "discernable, confined and discrete conveyance" and concluded
that groundwater by definition is "not 'discernable,' 'confined,' or
'discrete."'>9
The court also rejected the plaintiffs' second argument-the
hydrological connection theory-based on its reading of the CWA,
holding that the CWA excludes the theory.98 The theory, in the
plaintiffs' view, focuses on the absence of the word "directly" in the
relevant CWA provision.9 9 The theory is that because the CWA
only prohibits pollution discharged "to navigable waters from any
point source," the CWA allows pollutants to travel from a point
source through a nonpoint source and into navigable waters.100
This contention was unequivocally rejected by the Sixth Circuit,
which explained instead that even though the word "directly" is
missing, the phrase "discharged from point sources into navigable
waters" indicates directness and leaves no room for anything but
the pollution that comes from a point source.101 Furthermore, the
court rejected the plaintiffs' use of the language in Rapanos in
93 Id.
94 Id.
9 Id. at 932-33.
9Ky. Waterways All., 905 F. 3d at 933.
9 Id.
98 Id. at 934.
9 Id.
10 Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A)).
In) Ky. Waterways All., 905 F. 3d at 934 (quoting § 1362(11)).
2018-20191 293
294 KY. J. EQUINE, AGRIC. & NAT. RESOURCES L. [Vol. 11 No. 2
support of the theory.102 Though not binding precedent as a four-
justice plurality opinion, the plaintiffs took the lead from other
courts and litigants in relying on Rapanos, which stated that "[t]he
[CWA] does not forbid the 'addition of any pollutant directly to
navigable waters from any point source,' but rather 'the addition
of any pollutant to navigable waters."'
103
This holding also provides sharp insight into an issue that
has made interpreting the CWA so divisive-the battle between
government control and states' rights under cooperative
federalism.104 In doing so, the court explained that while the
plaintiffs rely on the CWA's goal of "restor[ing] and maintain[ing]
... the Nation's waters" to show that rejecting the "hydrological
connection" theory would undermine said purpose, this is only one
of many expressly stated purposes.105 Another purpose is the
CWA's goal to "recognize, preserve, and protect the primary
responsibilities and rights of the States to prevent, reduce, and
eliminate pollution .. ."106 The court acknowledged the importance
of protecting navigable waters, but also emphasized the role that
states play, regulating nonpoint-source pollution on their own,
under the CWA. 0 7 State regulation, in the court's view, allows the
focus of federal water pollution laws to be on the polluters, rather
than the pollution itself, with the states handling the rest.10
8
The way the CWA and RCRA interconnect was also an
important consideration in this case. The court took the approach
that the CWA and RCRA are mutually exclusive statutes, and
since coal ash is a solid waste and therefore under the RCRA's
coverage, to read the CWA to cover the pollution at issue would
exempt RCRA coverage-going against the stated purposes of both
statutes.0 9 Perhaps the most problematic issue that the court
brought up as support for its holding is the Coal Combustion
Residuals rule (CCR), which was issued by the EPA to specifically
'0 Id. at 935.
103 Id. (quoting Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 743 (plurality opinion)).
10 Id. at 937 (citing § 1251(b)).
'0 Id. at 936 (citing § 1251(a)).
1o6 Ky. Waterways All., 905 F. 3d at 936-37 (citing § 1251(b)).
1o7 Id. at 936-37 (citing § 1342(b); § 1311(a); § 1362(12)).
108 Id. at 937.
109 Id. at 937-38.
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cover coal ash storage and treatment.110 The court correctly
asserted that reading the CWA to cover coal ash ponds-like the
ones KU was using in their coal burning process-would make the
rule under the RCRA moot.1 1 ' With almost all coal ash ponds
sitting near navigable waterways, the court declined to adopt the
plaintiffs reading of the CWA because it would leave "the CCR
Rule virtually useless" and "effectively nullify the CCR Rule and
large portions of the RCRA.""12 Therefore, the court allowed the
plaintiffs RCRA claim to proceed, but declined to impose liability
on KU for its groundwater pollution under the CWA.113
ii. Tennessee Clean Water Network v. Tennessee Valley
Authority
A companion decision to Kentucky Waterways was
Tennessee Clean Water Network.114 In Tennessee Clean Water
Network, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) operated the
Gallatin Fossil Plant, a coal-fired electric plant on the Cumberland
River." 5 As part of its operations, the Gallatin Plant would dispose
of its coal ash into "unlined man-made coal ash ponds adjacent to
the river."116 Then, with an NPDES permit, the Gallatin Plant
would discharge some of its coal combustion wastewater into the
Cumberland River.'17 However, two Tennessee conservation
groups alleged that wastewater outside of what was allowed by
the NPDES was leaking from the ponds through the groundwater
into the Cumberland River."18 Consequently, the plaintiff
conservation groups brought a CWA citizen suit claiming that TVA
violated the CWA with this unpermitted discharge.1"9 Because the
Cumberland River is a waterway protected by the CWA, a dispute
n0 Id. at 938 (citing Hazardous and Solid Waste Management System; Disposal of
Coal Combustion Residuals From Electric Utilities, 80 Fed. Reg. 21,302 (Apr. 17, 2015) (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 257 & 261)).
M1 Ky. Waterways All., 905 F. 3d at 938.
12 Id. ("Adopting Plaintiffs' reading of the CWA would mean that any coal ash
pond with a hydrological connection to a navigable water would require an NPDES permit,
thus removing it from RCRA's coverage and, with it, the CCR Rule.").
n13 Id.
114 Tenn. Clean Water Network, 905 F.3d 436.
11 Id. at 438.
n6 Id.
11 Id. at 438, 440.
us Id. at 438, 441.
119 Tenn. Clean Water Network, 905 F.3d at 441.
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arose as to whether the alleged unpermitted discharge fell within
the CWA.120
Plaintiffs alleged that both of the ponds at the Gallatin
Plant-the Nonregistered Site and the Ash Pond Complex-were
leaking wastewater into the Cumberland River.121 According to the
district court, historical evidence established that significant
amounts of wastewater entered the Cumberland River from the
Ash Pond Complex, where approximately 11.5 million cubic yards
of coal ash is stored today.122 More specifically, the Ash Pond
Complex leaked "approximately 27 billion gallons of coal ash
wastewater" between 1970 and 1978 into the Cumberland River
through groundwater pollution.123 Although the Nonregistered
Site closed in 1998, approximately 2.3 million cubic yards of TVA's
coal ash continues to be stored there today.124 The district court
concluded that there was evidence that the Nonregistered Site
leaked into the Cumberland River and there was "no evidence to
suggest that the 'closure' of the site . . . wholly stopped the
leaking."125
The plaintiffs alleged that TVA violated the CWA because
containments from the two sites flowed through hydrologically
connected groundwater into the Cumberland River without a
permit.126 While the district court ruled in the plaintiffs' favor,127
the Sixth Circuit reversed its holding for several reasons.128 First,
the court rejected the hydrological connection theory by concluding
that groundwater is a nonpoint-source; therefore, TVA's alleged
discharge of pollutants into the groundwater is not subject to the
CWA and is not a CWA violation.129 Second, consistent with
Kentucky Waterways, the Court held that "the CCR Rule, not the
CWA, is the framework envisioned by Congress .. . to address the
120 Id. at 438.
121 Id. at 439, 441.
12Id. at 440.
i3 Id.
124 Tenn. Clean Water Network, 905 F.3d at 439.
in Id. at 440.
12' Id. at 441.
12 Id. at 441-42 (ruling "that a cause of action based on an unauthorized point
source discharge may be brought under the CWA based on discharges through groundwater,
if the hydrologic connection between the source of the pollutants and navigable waters is
direct, immediate, and can generally be traced").
12 Id. at 438.
29 Tenn. Clean Water Network, 905 F.3d at 444 (quoting Ky. Waterways All., 905
F.3d at 934).
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problem of groundwater contamination caused by coal ash
impoundments."130 As one can see, the Sixth Circuit stands firm in
its reading of the CWA-holding that the hydrological connection
theory would directly conflict with the RCRA and the CCR Rule.131
B. The Fourth and Ninth Circuits' Interpretations
1. Hawai'i Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui
Prior to Kentucky Waterways and Tennessee Clean Water
Network, the Ninth Circuit came down with Hawai'i Wildlife Fund
v. County of Maui,132 a decision the Sixth Circuit would later
staunchly oppose.133 The arguments made in Hawai'i Wildlife
Fund are more compelling than the Sixth Circuit's arguments
made in Kentucky Waterways and Tennessee Clean Water
Network. When the Supreme Court resolves the split among the
circuits, it should resolve it in favor of the Ninth Circuit's
interpretation.134
In this case, Hawai'i Wildlife Fund, Sierra Club-Maui
Group, Surfrider Foundation, and the West Maui Preservation
Association alleged that the County of Maui violated the CWA
when it discharged pollutants from four of its wells into the Pacific
Ocean.135 These wells, which release approximately three to five
million gallons of treated sewage-turned-wastewater a day, are the
primary means of wastewater disposal for the county.136 All four of
the wells used by the County of Maui ultimately dispose of this
collected wastewater into the Pacific Ocean via groundwater.137
The pollution in this case occurred without an NPDES permit,
130 Id. at 445-46.
131 Id.; Ky. Waterways All., 905 F.3d at 937-38; see also Appeals Court Denies
Rehearingin Tennessee CoalAsh Case, NEWSCHANNEL5 (Jan. 17, 2019), https://www.news-
channel5.com/news/appeals-court-denies-rehearing-in-tennessee-coal-ash-case
[https://perma.cc/LU3G-Z2N3] ("The full 6th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ... rejected en-
vironmental groups' request [for a rehearing] in the coal ash case at Tennessee Valley Au-
thority's Gallatin plant.").
I- Hawai'i Wildlife Fund, 881 F.3d 754.
133 See, e.g., Tenn. Clean Water Network, 905 F.3d 436; Ky. Waterways All., 905
F.3d at 925.
134 See generally, Hawai'i Wildlife Fund, 881 F.3d 754.
'3 Id. at 758.
1
3
6 Id.
137 Id.
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opening the door to the issue of CWA liability that is pervasive in
all of the aforementioned cases.138
The Ninth Circuit conducted its analysis under the
instructions of the CWA, which state in pertinent part that a party
violates the CWA when it "(1) discharge[s] (2) a pollutant (3) to
navigable waters (4) from a point source" without a permit.39
While the parties did not dispute that the four wells at issue were
point sources, the county and the plaintiff conservation groups did
dispute whether the CWA requires that point source pollution be
conveyed directly into the navigable water, which the plaintiffs
asserted the CWA does not require.14o Central to the county's
argument was the claim that the pollutants reached the Pacific
Ocean "through" groundwater-a nonpoint source-and therefore
the fourth element of a CWA violation claim was not satisfied.141
In support of its conclusion, the Ninth Circuit cited the
Second Circuit's holding in Concerned Area Residents for
Environment v. Southview Farm, a case that involved discharges
of liquid manure from tankers into fields, which then flowed into
navigable waters.142 There, the Second Circuit held that the
discharge from the tankers constituted a point-source discharge
because the pollutant itself was released from a point source and
because a direct connection existed between the field and the
navigable water, regardless of whether the field was a point source
under the CWA.143 Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit followed the
Second Circuit's lead by reading the text of the CWA in a way that
imposed liability on the county.'" The Ninth Circuit did so by
focusing on the plain language of the Act and pointed to the
absence of the word "directly" as evidence that even though the
pollutants were not conveyed explicitly from the point source into
the Pacific Ocean, said pollution could be traced back from the
13 Id. at 759-60.
'3 Hawai'i Wildlife Fund, 881 F.3d at 760 (citing Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irri-
gation Dist., 243 F.3d 526, 532 (9th Cir. 2001)).
140 Id. at 760-2.
1 Id. at 762 (citing Trustees for Alaska v. E.P.A., 749 F.2d 549, 558 (9th Cir.
1984)).
142 Id. at 763 (quoting Concerned Area Residents for EnV't v. Southview Farm, 34
F.3d 114, 119 (2d. Cir. 1994)).
14 Concerned Area Residents for Env't, 34 F.3d at 119; see also Hawai'i Wildlife
Fund, 881 F.3d at 763.
144 Hawai'i Wildlife Fund, 881 F.3d at 765.
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navigable water to the point source wells.145 This is the
hydrological connection theory in practice.
ii. Upstate Forever v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners
Shortly after the Ninth Circuit ruled in Hawai'i Wildlife
Fund, the Fourth Circuit decided Upstate Forever v. Kinder
Morgan Energy Partners in April 2018, after a pipeline in South
Carolina, owned by a subsidiary of Kinder Morgan Energy
Partners, LP, ruptured and spilled several hundred thousand
gallons of gasoline.146 Two conservation groups-Upstate Forever
and the Savannah Riverkeeper-sued Kinder Morgan under the
CWA when that gasoline made its way into nearby navigable
waters via groundwater.147 In their complaint, the plaintiff
conservation groups alleged that contaminants from the gasoline
seeped from a point source into the soil and groundwater, which
then continued to travel to nearby offshoots of the Savannah River,
Browns Creek, Cupboard Creek, their adjacent wetlands, and
three nearby lakes (Broadway Lake, Lake Secession, and Lake
Russell).148 Plaintiffs further alleged that this pollution was
conducted through a "direct hydrological connection."14 9
Kinder Morgan agreed that these waters and their adjacent
wetlands met the CWA's definition of "navigable waters," and they
similarly agreed with the plaintiffs that the gasoline and other
contaminants expelled from their pipeline constituted "pollutants"
under the CWA. 150 However, Kinder Morgan moved to dismiss
based on the hydrological connection theory and the district court
held that plaintiffs failed to state a claim on the grounds that
Kinder Morgan repaired the burst pipeline, and therefore, no point
source existed from which pollutants could be discharged "directly"
into navigable waters.151 In refusing to recognize the hydrological
connection theory, the district court found they had no subject
matter jurisdiction because the CWA does not cover pollutants
145 Id.
46 Upstate Forever, 887 F.3d at 641.
1
4 7 
Id.
'1 Id. at 643-44.
149 Id. at 644-45.
160 Id. at 645 n.3-4.
11 Upstate Forever, 887 F.3d at 645.
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that move through groundwater "hydrologically connected" to
navigable waters.152
As the Fourth Circuit pointed out, the violation at issue
hinges on whether "an indirect discharge of a pollutant through
ground water, which has a direct hydrological connection to
navigable waters, can support a theory of liability under the
CWA."1 53 The court unequivocally stated that Kinder Morgan's
gasoline pipeline was a point source.15 4 According to the Fourth
Circuit, temporal conditions are not placed on the discharge of a
pollutant from a point source, so Kinder Morgan's repair of the
pipeline had no effect on the court's analysis.15 5 However, the
dissent in Upstate Forever took issue with the court's reasoning,
arguing that pollutants must be transferred into navigable waters
in an ongoing process for there to be CWA liability.15 6 At the heart
of the issue, the Court found that the CWA "is not limited to
discharges of pollutants 'directly' from the point source to
navigable waters."5 7 Their interpretation is rooted in Rapanos,
where Justice Scalia noted that "[t]he Act does not forbid the
'addition of any pollutant directly to navigable waters from any
point source,' but rather 'the addition of any pollutant to navigable
waters."'15 8 This notion is in direct contention with the Sixth
Circuit's later holding that even though "directly" is absent from
the statutory text, the language of the CWA implies directness.1
5 9
The Fourth Circuit stated that since the CWA requires only
a discharge from a point source, it is not required under the CWA
that the starting point source itself convey the discharge directly
into navigable waters.6 0 Following Hawai'i Wildlife Fund, the
court recognized that a discharge "that passes from a point source
through ground water to navigable waters may support a claim
under the CWA" 16' so long as there is a connection between the
152 Id.
153 Id. at 646.
15 Id. at 647.
'5 Id. at 648.
156 Upstate Forever, 887 F.3d at 653 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (2019)).
157 Id. at 648.
'8 Id.; see also Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715, 743 (2006) (quoting 33 U.S.C. §
1362(12)(A)).
159 Ky. Waterways All., 905 F.3d at 934.
1so Upstate Forever, 887 F.3d at 650.
161 Id. at 651 (citing Hawai'i Wildlife Fund, 881 F.3d at 747).
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point source and the allegedly polluted navigable waters.162
Finally, the court concluded by considering the CWA's stated
purpose of zero tolerance for unpermitted discharges of
pollutants.163 In so doing, the court said it would undermine the
goals of the Act if all that was needed to defeat a claim was "the
presence of a short distance of soil and ground water" to avoid CWA
liability.164 In hindsight, this case, as well as the case of Hawai'i
Wildlife Fund, seem to foreshadow the litigation that sprung up in
the Sixth Circuit shortly thereafter.
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S DILEMMA: ADOPTING THE FOURTH AND
NINTH CIRCUITS' INTERPRETATION OF THE CWA
The Supreme Court has yet to rule on whether the
hydrological connection theory is valid, or if the CWA covers
connected groundwater. If parties truly hope to achieve the CWA's
stated goal of promoting the restoration and integrity of our
Nation's waters, accepting the hydrological connection theory
provides the best prospect of achieving the CWA's purpose.165 In
January 2019, President Trump's administration sought the
Supreme Court's review of the CWA debate explained in this
Note.66 Acknowledging the lack of consensus in this area, the
Supreme Court has granted certiorari to resolve the groundwater
issue once and for all.167 Not only could the Supreme Court answer
the question this split focuses on-whether a pollutant discharged
from a point source that passes through groundwater into
navigable waters without an NPDES permit is a CWA violation-
it could also create some clarity in the interpretation of Rapanos,
a case that each side used in their arguments.'16
162 Id. at 651.
i" Id. at 652 (citing 33 U.S.C.A. § 1311(a) (1995)).
164 Upstate Forever, 887 F.3d at 652.
1- 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a)(1) (1987).
16' Ellen M. Gilmer, Trump asks Supreme Court to Resolve Groundwater Fight,
E&E NEWS (Jan. 4, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060110985.
[https:perma.cc/J74U-3XH71.
167 Richard E. Morton, SCOTUS Will Reviewa Portion of the County ofMani Case
Involving a Clean Water Act Citizen Suit, NATIONAL L. REV. (Feb. 19, 2019),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/scotus-will-review-portion-county-maui-case-involv-
ing-clean-water-act-citizen-suit [https://perma.cc/KZP2-YGFY].
168 See Upstate Forever, 887 F.3d at 643; see also Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715.
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A point source is defined as a "discernible, confined and
discrete conveyance."16 9 One of the positions proposed by plaintiffs
in Kentucky Waterways in favor of a finding CWA coverage for
pollution discharge which migrates from groundwater to navigable
waters was the hydrological connection theory, which should be
accepted by the Supreme Court.170 As explained earlier in this
Note, this theory posits that even though groundwater is not a
point source, it is a means through which pollutants are discharged
into navigable waters from a traceable point source, and polluters
should not be able to evade liability because of this tenuous
difference when the pollution's source is still a point source.171
At the time Hawai'i Wildlife Fund was argued, President
Barack Obama's EPA supported the hydrological connection
theory through an amicus brief proposing a CWA liability rule that
would require a "direct hydrological connection" between the point
source and the navigable water being polluted.172 Under the
proposed regulations of the Trump administration, the
hydrological connection theory would be outside of the CWA's
jurisdiction, substantially reducing the ability to federally regulate
waters and would in effect give more power to the states.173
Specifically, the definition of WOTUS would go out of its way to
explicitly exclude groundwater, rendering the conclusions of the
Fourth and Ninth Circuits moot.17 4 Affirming the Fourth and
Ninth Circuits' holdings by agreeing that the CWA's coverage of
pollution conveyed through groundwater into navigable waters
would fulfill the purposes of the CWA, would give states a clearer
understanding of what the CWA regulates, and allows the EPA to
enforce the CWA to the best of its ability.175
M 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2018).
170 Ky. Waterways All., 905 F.3d at 932-33.
171 Id.
172 Hawai'i Wildlife Fund, 881 F.3d at 766 n.3.
in Joshua A. Bloom, 'Waters of the US' Would Alter Environmental Reg as we
Know It, THE HILL (Jan. 1, 2019), https://thehill.comlopinion/energy-environment/423340-
waters-ofthe-us-would-alter-environmental-reg-as-we-know-it [https://perma.c/YA9Q-
9TKX].
'"' Thompson Coburn LLP, 'Waters of the United States' Rule from EPA, Corps
May Make Real Estate Development More Easily Achievable and Less Costly, JDSUPRA
(Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/waters-of-the-united-states-rule-from-
12918/ [https://perma.cc/28ZU-NJLK.
175 See Kvien, supra note 23.
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Solicitor General of the United States Noel Francisco filed
a brief in January 2019 strongly advising the Supreme Court to
grant certiorari in Hawai'i Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui to
resolve the issue that left the Fourth, Ninth, and Sixth Circuits in
conflict.176 Francisco's brief argues that review is warranted not
only to resolve the circuit split but also because it is an issue that
many district courts face.177 In his brief, Francisco stated:
[T1he question presented "has the potential to affect
federal, state, and tribal regulatory efforts in
innumerable circumstances nationwide" and has
"significant" implications for regulated parties,
"including because [Clean Water Act] violators may
face serious civil penalties and, in certain cases,
criminal punishment."7 8
This is no small decision for the Supreme Court, but it is in
the Nation's best interest for the Fourth and Ninth Circuits'
rulings to be upheld, if we are to give effect to the true intent of the
CWA's language and eliminate the discharge of pollutants into
navigable waters altogether.179
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the United States Supreme Court has
recognized the problems that discrepancies in CWA
interpretations has created and is poised to resolve the split.18 0 As
history has shown, allowing jurisdictions to decide for themselves
whether to interpret the CWA narrowly or broadly, without much
guidance from the EPA, has created the split between the Sixth,
Fourth, and Ninth Circuits that presently exists. This split
punishes some actors, but allows others to evade punishment for
the same activities, reinforcing the idea that what matters is the
jurisdiction pollution occurs in. Pollution via groundwater is the
176 Burr & Forman, Solicitor General Urges SCOTUS to Resolve Groundwater Cir-
cuit Split, JDSUPRA (Jan. 11, 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/solicitor-general-
urges-scotus-to-68388/ [https://perma.cc/N9JC-2BUN.
17 Id.
78 Id.
1" See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (2018).
1so Morton, supra note 167.
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common thread that ties these circuit cases together, but whether
the CWA covers this type of pollution has created a divergence in
interpretation that the Supreme Court has recognized as worthy
of resolution.18 1
Accepting the Fourth and Ninth Circuits' rulings- though
much broader interpretations than the Sixth Circuit's reading of
the CWA-most closely honors the language and intent of the Act.
To follow the Sixth Circuit's holdings would be to ignore the goals
of the CWA in favor of a narrow and more restrictive reading of the
statute. The hydrological connection theory should be adopted by
the Supreme Court in CWA cases if the statute is to stand in its
full effect. Despite changes in EPA policy that come as a result of
the fluctuation in ideals of each executive administration, the
Supreme Court's guidance in this area will provide much-needed
clarity and create a standard that is easier to follow in a highly
controversial area of environmental aw.
181 Id.
